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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) represented the crowning 
achievement of the first year of unified Republican control of the federal 
government’s political branches.1  President Donald Trump and 
Republicans in Congress sold the Act as a tax cut that would benefit the 
middle class.  In an apparently coordinated effort, President Trump, Senate 
majority leader Mitch McConnell, and Speaker of the House Paul Ryan 
issued statements trumpeting the $2,000 tax cut that the median income 
household of four would receive in 2018.2   
In opposing the tax bill, Democrats also tried to position themselves 
as champions of the middle class.  Democrats blasted the bill as a 
giveaway to special interest groups and wealthy with little to no tax relief 
for the middle class.3  According to Senate Minority Leader Chuck 
                                                          
*  Chancellor's Professor of Law, Berkeley Law, University of California. 
 1.   Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 2.   President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump and American Taxpayers on Tax 
Reform (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
american-taxpayers-tax-reform/; Press Release, Representative Paul Ryan, Speaker Ryan’s Floor 
Remarks on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.speaker.gov/press-
release/speaker-ryans-floor-remarks-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act; Senator Mitch McConnell, Tax Bill Tells 
Middle Class Americans “We Heard You,” FOX NEWS (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
opinion/2017/12/20/sen-mitch-mcconnell-tax-bill-tells-middle-class-americans-heard.html.  The tax 
cut resulted from an increase in the stadard deduction, a decreate in marginal tax rates, and an increase 
and expansion of the child tax credit.  See TAX FOUNDATION STAFF, PRELIMINARY DETAILS AND 
ANALYSIS OF THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 3–4 (Rachel Shuster ed., 2017), 
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171220113959/TaxFoundation-SR241-TCJA-3.pdf (describing the 
details of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act).  According to Republicans, the benefits to the middle class went 
beyond the direct tax cuts they would receive.  Even those tax benefits that went to corporations and 
the wealthy, Republican supporters asserted, would eventually trickle down to the middle class 
through more and better jobs and higher wages.  See Ben White, GOP Places Risky Bet on Trickle-
down Tax Cut, POLITICO (Nov. 30, 2017, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2017/11/30/republicans-trickle-down-tax-cut-196333 (“Republicans are counting on predictions from 
the administration that the corporate tax cuts will produce as much as $4,000 per year in extra pay for 
households and a 0.4 percent boost to annual economic growth . . . .”). 
 3.   See, e.g., Senator Chuck Schumer, Schumer Statement on GOP Tax Bill (Dec. 1, 2017), 
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-statement-on-gop-tax-bill 
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Schumer, the passage of the tax bill “will be the first day of a new 
Republican party—one that raises taxes on the middle class, abandoning 
its principles for its political paymasters.”4  House Minority Leader Nancy 
Pelosi described the Act as “written first and foremost for the wealthiest 
one percent, not middle class families trying to get ahead.”5 
The congressional committee responsible for providing spending and 
revenue estimates to Congress, the non-partisan Joint Committee on 
Taxation, issued a report on the TCJA that provided support for both sides 
of the debate.6  In support of the Republican claims, the report showed that 
prior to the expiration of the individual tax cuts in 2025, individuals with 
annual incomes greater than $30,000 would pay less in taxes.7  But in 
support of the Democratic claims, the report also showed that in 2027, 
after the individual tax cuts expired, individuals with annual incomes 
between $30,000 and $75,000 would pay more in taxes than they would 
under the tax code that preceded the TCJA.8 
As the two parties fought back and forth on the question of how the 
TCJA would affect the middle class, they ignored a clear impact of the 
law.  The poor would be the only group harmed by the law both prior to 
                                                          
(describing the bill as “chock full of special interest giveaways” that “will stuff even more money in 
the pockets of the wealthy and the biggest corporations, while raising taxes on millions in the middle 
class”).   
 4.   Schumer, supra note 3. 
 5.   Press Release, Representative Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement on Senate Passage of GOP 
Tax Scam (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/12217-2/.   
 6.   See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” (JCX-68-17), (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5054; see also Congressional Budget 
Act, 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2012) (establishing the Joint Committee on Taxation’s estimates of revenue 
and spending as the official estimate for all congressional tax legislation).   
 7.   JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 1–3.  The report showed that benefits from the 
reduction in marginal tax rates and expansion of the child tax credit would outweigh the costs from 
the reduction and elimination of deductions, the change in the inflation measure on which tax rates are 
calculated, and the elimination of the Affordable Car Act’s individual mandate.  See id.   
 8.   Id. at 4–5.  Even though the marginal tax rates, deductions, and the child tax credit would 
return to the pre-TCJA levels after the expiration of the individual tax cut in 2025, the permanent 
changes in the inflation measure for tax rates and the permanent elimination of the Affordable Care 
Act’s individual mandate would leave the middle class worse off.  See id.; see also Andrew Van Dam, 
The Essential Tradeoff in the Republican Tax Bill, in One Chart, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/16/the-essential-tradeoff-in-the-
republican-tax-bill-in-one-chart/?utm_term=.a660f5db2158 (describing how the permanent repeal of 
the Affordable Care Act and the change in the inflation index for tax brackets will increase taxes on 
individuals in the long run); Michael Hiltzik, The Chained CPI: Another Secret Tax Hike for the 
Middle Class Slipped Into the GOP Tax Bills, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017, 11:05 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-chained-cpi-tax-bill-20171121-story.html 
(describing the effect of the shift from indexing tax brackets to the Consumer Price Index to indexing 
tax brackets to the chained Consumer Price Index and concluding that the shift is “all about taking 
more money from working Americans and sending it up the income ladder to the wealthy”).  
 
2018 A CONSTITUTIONAL PATH 923 
and after the expiration of the temporary provisions of the Act.  By 2021, 
individuals with annual incomes below $30,000 comprise the only income 
class that will pay more in taxes under the TCJA than under the current 
tax code.9  This income class would continue to pay more in taxes through 
the expiration of the individual tax cut provisions in 2025.10  Despite this 
clear evidence, neither the Republicans touting the bill nor the Democrats 
opposing the bill addressed the negative impact of the law on the poor.11 
The fact that no champion of the poor stood up might seem shocking 
given that over forty million Americans lived below the poverty line 
(12.7%) in 2016 and as recently as 2014, 51% of Americans made less 
than $30,000 per year.12  But the lack of advocacy for the lower income 
class in the TCJA debates is consistent with recent empirical findings 
about the poor’s representation in the political process.  In an analysis of 
the relationship between the policy preferences of different income classes 
and Senate roll call votes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, political 
scientist Larry Bartels found that senators were very responsive to high-
income constituents, moderately responsive to middle-income 
constituents, and not at all responsive to low-income constituents.13  
Another political scientist, Martin Gilens, has found that on issues for 
which the preferences of the different income groups diverge, only the 
policy preferences of the affluent voters are positively and statistically 
                                                          
 9.   See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 2 (showing that by 2021, individuals 
making less than $10,000 will receive a tax cut totaling $60 million while those making between 
$10,000 and $30,000 will pay nearly $4 billion more in taxes).  
 10.   See id. at 3–4 (showing individuals making less than $30,000 will be paying $5.74 billion 
more in taxes by 2023 and $6.14 billion more in taxes by 2025).  The combination of the shift in the 
measure of inflation for tax brackets, the elimination of the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, 
and Republican refusal to make the expanded child tax credit refundable for those who do not pay 
enough in federal taxes contributed to the TCJA’s tax increase on the poor.  See Doyle McManus, 
What’s Missing from the GOP Tax Bill? Just About Anything That Would Help the Working and 
Middle Classes, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2017, 4:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
mcmanus-taxes-missing-20171217-story.html (describing how the different tax changes provide little 
benefit to the working poor).   
 11.   In the absence of strong and politically connected advocates for the poor that could feed the 
media with information about the law’s negative impact on the poor, which would raise the saliency 
of the issue, very few media outlets addressed the issue leaving both Democrats and Republicans free 
to ignore the issue.  See DARA Z. STROLOVITCH, AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCACY: RACE, CLASS, AND 
GENDER IN INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 113–120 (2007) (finding a lack of representation of economic 
issues affecting low interest groups among advocacy organizations, particularly organizations 
focusing on identity-based issues). 
 12.   JESSICA L. SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2016 13 (2017), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/ 
demo/P60-259.pdf ; Wage Statistics for 2014, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., (last visited Apr. 63, 2018), 
https://www.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/netcomp.cgi?year=2014.  
 13.   LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 252–82 (2008).  
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significantly associated with policy outcomes.14  There is no statistically 
significant relationship between the preferences of median and low-
income voters and policy outcomes.15  This pattern held for the economic 
policy issues Gilens examined, which include redistributive policies 
involving the minimum wage, unemployment benefits, corporate 
regulations, and income taxes.16 
What explains this lack of representation for the poor?  Many point to 
the campaign finance and lobbying system that rewards with influence 
those who have money to contribute and spend in support of campaigns.17  
This is unlikely to change in the current campaign finance regulatory 
context constitutionalized by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, which advantages the wealthy by providing 
for the free flow of money into politics.18  Others point to a related factor—
the lack of elected representatives from working class or poor 
backgrounds.19  The demand for money to run a successful campaign 
means that those who either have money or know people with money have 
an advantage in running for office.  The poor’s lack of descriptive 
representation, which is also unlikely to change in the current campaign 
                                                          
 14.   MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA 79–83 (2012). 
 15.   Id. at 81, 86. 
 16.   Id. at 112–15.   
 17.   See Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality in the Age of Citizens United, 93 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (describing the political advantages of the wealthy produced by our 
campaign finance and lobbying system and proposals to reduce these advantages); see also Editorial 
Board, The Tax Bill that Inequality Created, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/16/opinion/sunday/tax-bill-inequality-created.html (accounting 
for the relationship between political inequality from the campaign finance system and policy 
outcomes).  
 18.   See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that as 
political speech is protected by the First Amendment, the government may not prevent corporations 
from spending money to support or denounce candidates during elections); see also Wendy L. Hansen 
et al., Abstract, The Effects of Citizens United on Corporate Spending in the 2012 Presidential 
Election, 77 J. POL. 535, 535 (2015) (“The 2012 presidential election saw a 594% increase in 
independent expenditures from the 2008 election . . . leaving little doubt that the Supreme Court’s 
landmark 2010 Citizens United decision opened the campaign spending floodgates.”); Douglas M. 
Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent 
Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 347 (2014) (finding, through an experiment comparing states 
with and without bans on independent expenditures prior to Citizens United, that the decision caused 
an increase in independent spending). 
 19.   See NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN 
ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 20 (Benjamin I. Page et al. eds., 2013) (finding that only about 6% of 
congress members serving between 1999 and 2008 held a working class job at some point in their 
careers).   
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finance regulatory context, might contribute to their lack of substantive 
representation in the democratic process.20 
Still others attribute the underrepresentation of the poor to the fact that 
the poor do not vote as much as other income classes.21  Since the early 
1970s, there has been a consistent 25–35% turnout gap between 
individuals in the lowest and highest income quintiles.22  To the extent that 
there is a correlation between turnout and representation, the failure of the 
poor to vote will lead to less representation in the political process. 
Scholars have conventionally attributed the low turnout of the poor to 
cost barriers of voting.23  But when states and localities have reduced the 
cost barriers to voting, the turnout of the poor has either remained 
unchanged or declined.24  This paradox has led scholars to search for other 
explanations of the poor’s low turnout. 
In the 1990s, mobilization scholars found evidence that the poor’s lack 
of turnout is connected to candidates’ lack of engagement with this group 
during the electoral process.25  They identified a vicious cycle in which the 
poor, not perceiving benefits from voting in the form of laws and policies 
advancing their needs and interests, have mostly stayed home on election 
                                                          
 20.   See id. at 25–33 (finding a relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, 
but the author’s data was limited to a small sample of congresspersons with low income and working 
class backgrounds).   
 21.   Political scientist V.O. Key famously asserted, “The blunt truth is that politicians and 
officials are under no compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote.”  
V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 527 (1st ed. 1949).  Since Key’s famous 
assertion, a number of political scientists have questioned the relationship between voting and 
representation, finding on the basis of survey evidence that the preferences, ideologies and interests 
are indistinguishable.  See, e.g., RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 
104–14 (1980); John Sides, Eric Schickler, & Jack Citrin, If Everyone Had Voted, Would Bubba and 
Dubya Have Won?, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 521, 522–23 (2008) (“The main conclusion of research 
on the relationship between turnout and electoral outcomes in congressional, Senate, and presidential 
elections is that the impact of higher turnout is both variable and usually small.”) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 22.   JAN E. LEIGHLEY & JONATHAN NAGLER, WHO VOTES NOW? DEMOGRAPHICS, ISSUES, 
INEQUALITY, AND TURNOUT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014); Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, 
Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1972-2004 24 (Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Aug. 26, 2006);.   
 23.   According to the resource model of participation, the nonvoting of the poor is best explained 
by the fact that they lack the resources in terms of eduation, employment, and income to overcome the 
cost barriers to voting.  See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE supra note 21, at 24 (finding that education 
has the most powerful independent effect on turnout); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, 
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 13–15 (1972) (finding 
that job, education, and income are the primary determinants of political participation).   
 24.   Richard A. Brody, The Puzzle of Participation in America, in THE NEW AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 287, 291–99 (Anthony King ed., 1978).   
 25.   See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 213 (Bruce Nichols & Robert Miller eds., 1993) (finding as a source of the 
poor’s decline of interest in politics, the “changing pattern[s]of mobilization by parties, campaigns, 
and social movements” that focused less on the needs of the politically marginalized).   
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day.26  Candidates and elected representatives have in turn responded to 
the poor’s nonvoting by ignoring their interests and needs in the 
lawmaking process.27  If this account of the relationship between 
participation and representation is correct, breaking this vicious cycle may 
be the key to fairer representation for the poor. 
Can law be used to break the cycle of under-representation and 
politically empower the poor?  One response might be to follow the voting 
rights model used to empower racial minorities.  The Voting Rights Act 
has secured fairer representation for communities of color through 
enforcement of a group-based right to representation in the political 
process.28  However, there are two overwhelming obstacles to applying the 
VRA model of fair representation to the poor.  First, the original VRA was 
the product of social movement pressure from African Americans and 
others on Congress and the President to protect the voting rights of people 
                                                          
 26.   Id. at 6 (“[P]eople who see more at stake in politics, whether because policies affect them 
more, identities beckon them more, options appeal to them more, or duty calls them more, are more 
attracted by the many benefits that politics offers”).   
 27.   See BARTELS, supra note 13; GILENS, supra note 14.   
 28.   Congress first advanced a statutory mandate of racial minority representation in the political 
process through its amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Section 2 of the amended 
Voting Rights Act prohibits states or political subdivisions from imposing any voting qualification 
that “results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account 
of race or color.”  52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012) (originally enacted as 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)).  The 
section continues: 
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is 
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected 
by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (Supp. III 2015) (originally enacted as 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).  In adopting the 
amended VRA, Congress overturned the Supreme Court case of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), 
which interpreted Section 2 of the 1965 VRA to require that challenges prove that the state acted with 
discriminatory intent in establishing voting barriers.  See H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 2 (1981) (“The 
amendment is necessary because of the unsettling effect of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).  The amendment clarifies . . . that proof of purpose or 
intent is not a prerequisite to establishing voting discrimination violations in Section 2 cases.”).  But 
in doing so, Congress made clear through the amended VRA the goal of increasing the number of 
racial minorities in elected office.  See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (Supp. III 2015) (originally enacted as 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)) (finding as a relevant circumstantial factor under the totality of the circumstances 
test, “[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State of 
political subdivision”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 8 (finding as evidence of the lack of progress under 
the VRA the fact that “[t]he number of minority elected officials is still a fraction of the total number 
of elected officials”).  In a subsequent case, the Court established a three-factor test that defined the 
statutory right in group-based representational terms. Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).  In 
order to prove a violation under Section 2 of the VRA, the challenger to the districting practice must 
prove: (1) “the minority group . . . is able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,” (2) “the minority group . . . is politically 
cohesive,” and (3) “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the 
minority’s preferred candidate.”  Id. at 50–51.  
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of color.29  The poor currently lack a social movement that would be able 
to put similar pressure on the political branches to adopt a statute like the 
VRA for the poor. 
Given this political reality, constitutional law is a natural place to turn 
in seeking a VRA-like model of fair representation for the poor.30  After 
all, the courts are sometimes willing to protect the rights of the 
marginalized when the political branches will not.  But a second obstacle 
emerged nearly five decades ago, when the Supreme Court appeared to 
close down this constitutional path to securing group-based representation 
for the poor.  In 1971, in the context of the War on Poverty, a group of 
African American poor residents in Marion County, Indiana advanced a 
constitutional claim for fair representation that might have broken the 
cycle of under-representation.31  The focus of the constitutional claim was 
on a districting practice alleged to deny the African American poor in 
Marion County the opportunity to elect candidates more in proportion with 
their share of the population.32  The Supreme Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis 
rejected the claim, finding the group’s lack of proportional representation 
to be constitutionally irrelevant in the absence of evidence that poor 
individuals had less opportunity to participate in the political process and 
elect candidates of their choice.33 
By rejecting the group-based model of representation, did the 
Whitcomb Court shut the door to any opportunity for the poor to secure 
fair representation through the Constitution?  In this article, I argue that 
while the Court shut one door, it left another open.  Even after Whitcomb, 
the poor continue to be entitled to fair representation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  But rather than through a group-
based right to representation, constitutional doctrine secures fair 
representation for politically marginalized groups like the poor through a 
guarantee of full and effective participation in the political process.34   
The Court effectuated part of this constitutional guarantee in two cases 
decided in the 1960s striking down mal-apportioned congressional and 
                                                          
 29.   See, e.g., Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights 
Act as a Blueprint for Police Reform, 105 CAL. L. REV. 263, 286–88 (2017) (describing the catalyzing 
effect of civil rights protest and the violent confrontation between the police and protesters in Selma, 
Alabama on the passage of the Voting Rights Act).   
 30.   Famously, in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products, the Court tentatively 
announced as a judicial role the close scrutiny of laws that discriminate against discrete and insular 
minorities.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).   
 31.   403 U.S. 124, 128–29 (1971).   
 32.   Id. 
 33.   Id. at 160. 
 34.   See infra Part III. 
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state legislative districts as inconsistent with one-person, one vote.35  The 
one person, one vote requirement that every persons vote count the same, 
secured to individuals full participation in the political process through 
equipopulous districts.36  But the guarantee to individuals of full 
participation did not ensure they would be effective participants in the 
political process.  Instead, as the Court acknowledged in a case right after 
it established one person, one vote, the votes of individuals could be 
unconstitutionally cancelled out or minimized in equipopulous districts.37  
In this Article, I argue that this right to effective participation, which has 
never been fleshed out in doctrine, should be understood to require states 
to draw competitive districts as a means to incentivize candidates to vie 
for the votes of members of all groups.38  Doing so would ensure the 
effectiveness of every individual’s votes by preventing political actors 
from ignoring or overlooking any persons’ vote without electoral 
consequences.39 
This article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, I describe the 
constitutional claim for group-based representation that the African 
American poor advanced, and the Court ultimately rejected, in Whitcomb.  
In Part II, I argue that the African American poor misunderstood the 
constitutional basis for challenging districting practices established in the 
one-person, one vote cases.  In Part III, I advance an alternative theory of 
the constitutional right protected in constitutional doctrine.  I then show 
that this right to effective participation is a more viable path to fair 
representation for the poor than the group-based representation model that 
the African American poor advanced in Whitcomb. 
                                                          
 35.   See infra Part II.A. 
 36.   See infra Part II.A.   
 37.   See infra Part II.B.   
 38.   See infra Part III. 
 39.   See infra Part III.   
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II. CLAIMING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO GROUP-BASED 
REPRESENTATION 
The last sustained effort to politically empower the poor dates back to 
the 1960s and early 1970s.  As part of the War on Poverty, Congress in the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 created and funded local non-
government agencies labeled Community Action Agencies.40  These 
agencies had boards that made decisions on the allocation of federal 
funding to Community Action Programs in poor communities.41  For these 
boards, the Equal Opportunity Act mandated a unique and controversial 
design feature: “the maximum feasible participation” of the people 
impacted by the decisions of the board.42  Some designers of community 
action saw maximum feasible participation as a vehicle for the political 
empowerment of many groups, including the poor.43  According to one 
account, “[maximum feasible participation] meant starting with the most 
downtrodden.  It meant that women ought to have an equal say-so with 
men.  It meant that poor folks ought to have an equal say-so with upwardly 
mobile, upper middle-class [people].”44 
The political empowerment of the poor through these agencies, 
however, never came to fruition due to confusion surrounding the meaning 
of the maximum feasible participation mandate and weak federal 
enforcement.45  Resistance from local government actors, Southern and 
Republican opposition, and the election of a Republican President who 
opposed some of the central elements of the War on Poverty contributed 
to the failure of the community action experiment.46 
                                                          
 40.   42 U.S.C. §§ 2781–2837 (1964) (repealed 1981). See Karen M. Tani, The House that 
“Equality” Built: The Asian American Movement and the Legacy of Community Action, in THE WAR 
ON POVERTY: A NEW GRASSROOTS HISTORY 1964–1980 411, 414 (Annelise Orleck & Lisa Gayle 
Hazirjian eds., 2011) (“Between 1964 and 1968, the Office of Economic Opportunity channeled funds 
into more than one thousand local community action agencies (CAAs), which administered services 
ranging from legal assistance to job training.”).   
 41.   See id. at 415–16 (providing examples of how Asian American Community Action Agencies 
administered federal funds).   
 42.   MICHAEL L. GILLETTE, LAUNCHING THE WAR ON POVERTY: AN ORAL HISTORY 95–99 (2d 
ed. 2010) (describing early debates on the meaning of “maximum feasible participation”).   
 43.   Id. at 99. 
 44.   Id. (alteration in original). 
 45.   See KENNETH B. CLARK & JEANNETTE HOPKINS, A RELEVANT WAR AGAINST POVERTY: A 
STUDY OF COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS AND OBSERVABLE SOCIAL CHANGE 107 (1969) (finding 
that the poor were rarely “numerically in a dominant position” on community action boards “[a]nd 
never are they in a dominant position in terms of actual power and influence”).   
 46.   See, e.g., Annelise Orleck, Conclusion: The War on the War on Poverty and American 
Politics Since the 1960s, in THE WAR ON POVERTY, supra note 40, at  437, 437–44 (describing the 
reshaping and elimination of anti-poverty programs beginning with the election of President Richard 
Nixon).   
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As the Community Action programs teetered, poor African Americans 
in Marion County, Indiana pursued another strategy designed to empower 
the poor. They advanced a novel constitutional claim that the poor as a 
group had a right to representation in the legislative process.47  Self-
described “ghetto residents” of Marion County pushed a litigation strategy 
inspired by language in a then-recent Supreme Court case, Fortson v. 
Dorsey.48 
In Fortson, the Court addressed a constitutional challenge to a multi-
member district—a district in which multiple legislators represented it.49  
The challengers, residents of the multi-member district, argued that 
Indiana’s creation and maintenance of the district violated their equal 
protection rights by making their votes less equal than others and therefore 
denying to them fair representation in the political process.50  The Court 
rejected the challengers’ equal protection claim, finding no mathematical 
disparity in the representative-to-population ratio for the multi-member 
district (a critical factor in the Court’s one-person, one vote constitutional 
determinations that I describe in Part III).51  The Court did, however, leave 
an opening for other types of challenges to multi-member districts.  In 
dicta, the Court surmised, “[i]t might well be that, designedly or otherwise, 
a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the 
circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel 
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting 
population.”52  “When this is demonstrated,” the Court continued, “it will 
be time enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional 
muster.”53 
The poor African Americans of Marion County interpreted the dicta 
in Fortson as giving courts the authority to remedy group-based 
representation harms.54  And the district court agreed.  The court 
determined that the ghetto residents comprised an identifiable racial 
minority group with distinct interests who experienced worse conditions 
                                                          
 47.   Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 128–29 (1971). 
 48.   See infra Part III.B. (describing in further detail the case and its context).   
 49.   Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 434–35 (1965).   
 50.   Brief for the Appellees at 6–8, Fortson, 379 U.S. 433 (No. 178), 1964 WL 81329, at *5–*8 
(providing mathematical proof of the devaluation of individual votes in multi-member districts and 
connecting this mathematical proof to the denial of fair representation in the political process). 
 51.   Fortson, 379 U.S. at 437–38.   
 52.   Id. at 439.   
 53.   Id.   
 54.   Brief of the Appellees at 11, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (No. 92), 1970 WL 
136610, at *11. 
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and received less governmental services than other groups in the district.55  
The court linked these burdens on the poor African Americans with their 
under-representation in the political process, which resulted in part from 
the multi-member districting scheme in Marion County, Indiana.56  The 
court found in the multi-member districting scheme that members of the 
Center Township ghetto area had disproportionately fewer representatives 
with only 4.75% of the senators and 5.97% of the representatives for an 
area of the County that comprised 17.8% of the population.57  This 
translated into the election of one state senator and four state 
representatives in the four elections between 1962 and 1968 for an area 
large enough “to elect approximately two members of the House of 
Representatives and approximately one senator” if single-member districts 
replaced the multi-member districts in Marion County.58   
The combination of the political parties’ strong control over the 
selection of candidates and the limited influence that poor African 
Americans had over the parties’ candidate selection process exacerbated 
the under-representation of the group in the political process.59  In this 
political context, poor African Americans had less opportunity to elect 
“prospective legislators of their choice,” which meant few legislators were 
accountable to the ghetto residents in the political process.60  The evidence 
of the ghetto residents’ unequal representation in Marion County 
convinced the court to hold the multi-member districting scheme 
unconstitutional and mandate that the state draw uniformly sized districts 
throughout the state.61 
A theory of the path to political empowerment and fair representation 
appeared to motivate the poor African Americans’ challenge to the multi-
member district and the district court appeared to embrace the theory.  By 
confining poor African Americans to the status of a small minority of the 
voting population, the multi-member districting scheme denied to them 
the opportunity to elect candidates responsive to their interests.  To secure 
greater responsiveness, the ghetto residents wanted the court to force states 
to draw single-member districts that they could control, which would 
presumably be majority poor or close to it.62  Representatives of these 
                                                          
 55.   Id. at *9–*11.  
 56.   Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. at 1385–86. 
 57.   Id. at 1383–84.   
 58.   See id. at 1383–85.  
 59.   Id. at 1386.   
 60.   Id.   
 61.   Id. at 1391–92.   
 62.   See Brief of the Appellees at 3–4, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (No. 92), 1970 
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majority African American poor, single-member districts would have no 
choice but to be responsive to the needs and interests of the poor or risk 
being voted out of office. 
The poor African Americans’ apparent theory of the path toward fair 
representation would never be tested.  The Supreme Court overturned the 
district court’s decision and upheld the constitutionality of the multi-
member districting scheme in Marion County.63  Three aspects of the 
ghetto residents’ constitutional claim concerned the Court and contributed 
to its decision to reject it.  First, the African American poor’s group rights 
claim to fair representation conflicted with prior judicially defined limits 
of the Equal Protection Clause to individual rights claims.64  Second, even 
if the Court were willing to break with precedent and recognize a group-
based right to fair representation, this would introduce tricky questions, 
including which groups are entitled to fair representation and what 
happens when different groups’ claims to fair representation are 
irreconcilable.65  And finally, since group under-representation is an 
inevitable product of a winner-take-all democratic system in which there 
are winners and losers, the recognition of a constitutional claim of fair 
representation would require courts to distinguish between constitutional 
and unconstitutional under-representation arising from the same source—
losing elections.66 
                                                          
WL 136610, at *3–4 (criticizing the multi-member districting scheme because it allowed the affluent 
and near affluent to dominate legislative seats and ignore the interests of the ghetto residents in Marion 
County and arguing that a shift to uniform single-member dsitricts would secure representation for the 
ghetto residents).  
 63.   Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160 (1971).   
 64.   Id. at 146, 149 (“The real-life impact of multi-member districts on individual voting power 
ha[d] not been sufficiently demonstrated.”).  
 65.   The Court in Whitcomb explained,  
[t]he District Court’s holding, although on the facts of this case limited to guaranteeing one 
racial group representation, is not easily contained.  It is expressive of the more general 
proposition that any group with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls 
if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and represents a majority living in 
an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district.  This approach would 
make it difficult to reject claims of Democrats, Republicans, or members of any political 
organization in Marion County who live in what would be safe districts in a single-member 
district system but who in one year or another, or year after year, are submerged in a one-
sided multi-member district vote.  There are also union oriented workers, the university 
community, religious or ethnic groups occupying identifiable areas of our heterogeneous 
cities and urban areas.  Indeed, it would be difficult for a great many, if not most, multi-
member districts to survive analysis under the District Court’s view unless combined with 
some voting arrangement such as proportional representation or cumulative voting aimed 
at providing representation for minority parties or interests. 
Id. at 156–57 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
 66.   The Court in Whitcomb recognized and embraced as constitutionally acceptable our winner-
take-all system of elections: 
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The Court in Whitcomb maintained consistency with precedent and 
avoided difficult group-based representation questions by denying the 
ghetto residents’ constitutional claim to fair representation.  But in doing 
so, the Court only added to the confusion surrounding the constitutionality 
of districting practices.  In its standard developed to address constitutional 
claims against multi-member districts, the Court in Fortson v. Dorsey 
appeared to embrace a constitutional principle grounded in protecting the 
rights of groups to fair representation.  Multi-member districting schemes 
might run afoul of the Constitution, according to the Court in Fortson, 
when they cancel out or minimize the voting power of racial or political 
elements.67 
What then triggered the Court’s reluctance to endorse a group-based 
right to fair representation in Whitcomb?  In the next two Parts, I argue 
that the ghetto residents in Whitcomb misunderstood the constitutional 
right articulated in Fortson.  Rather than directly protecting the right to 
group-based representation, the Court in Fortson and its predecessors 
established protections for participatory rights that would lead to fairer 
representation in the political process. 
III. THE RIGHT TO FULL PARTICIPATION 
In two cases decided prior to Fortson, the Court entered the political 
thicket of districting.  First, the court in Baker v. Carr declared 
constitutional claims against mal-apportioned districts justiciable.  Then 
in Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims, the Court struck down 
congressional and state legislative districting plans that created unequally 
populated single-member districts.  In this Part, I argue the Court in those 
cases established the right to full and effective participation in the political 
process.  In protecting these participatory rights from mal-apportioned 
districts, the Court recognized that a logical consequence would be greater 
fairness in representation.  But what has been consistently overlooked by 
courts and scholars is that the Court in Wesberry and Reynolds never 
protected a constitutional right to fair and effective representation in the 
political process.  Rather, the fair and effective representation advanced in 
                                                          
As our system has it, one candidate wins, the others lose.  Arguably the losing candidates’ 
supporters are without representation since the men they voted for have been defeated; 
arguably they have been denied equal protection of the laws since they have no legislative 
voice of their own.  This is true of both single-member and multimember districts.  But we 
have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to losing 
candidates, even in those so-called ‘safe’ districts where the same party wins year after 
year. 
Id. at 153.   
 67.   Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). 
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the one-person, one-vote cases is that which arose from the Court’s 
constitutional protection of the right to full and effective participation in 
the political process.  
A. The One-Person, One-Vote Cases 
Several decades of state refusal to draw equally apportioned districts 
finally brought the Supreme Court into a political thicket that it had long 
tried to avoid.68  The stranglehold that representatives from rural under-
populated districts had over state legislatures functioned as a prohibitive 
obstacle in some states to drawing equally apportioned districts.69  With 
no avenue for democratic correction of mal-apportioned districts in 
Tennessee, the Court in Baker v. Carr found a constitutional claim against 
the state’s mal-apportioned districts to be justiciable.70 
The Court entered into the political thicket cautiously recognizing the 
pitfalls of getting too involved in the political quagmire of districting 
disputes.  The massive southern resistance to Brown v. Board of Education 
that threatened judicial legitimacy and integrity served as a reminder to the 
Court of the limits of judicial authority as an unelected, unaccountable 
institution equipped with neither the purse nor the sword.71  Thus, although 
the Court recognized that it was the only institution with the will to redress 
districting practices that undermined a fundamental principle of 
democracy, majority rule, it would have to do so in a way that would 
preserve judicial legitimacy and integrity.   
As indicated by the Court’s initial concern about reviewing districting 
controversies, preserving judicial legitimacy and integrity required two 
                                                          
 68.   See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (finding constitutional claims against 
mal-apportioned districts non-justiciable and famously declaring, “[c]ourts ought not to enter this 
political thicket”). 
 69.   See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE 
PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 54–55 (Ira Katznelson ed., 
2008) (describing the different sources of mal-apportionment prior to 1960).   
 70.   Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226–37 (1962).  After Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green 
famously warned the Court against entering the “political thicket” of districting controversies that 
could embroil the Court in partisan politics, 328 U.S. 549, 554–56 (1946), the Court decided to do so.  
Responding to legislative unwillingness to properly apportion districts and the absence of a 
referendum process that would allow the people to override the legislature, the Court decided to 
involve itself in the constitutional resolution of districting controversies.  See Baker, 369 U.S. at 237.   
 71.   See Alexander Hamilton, No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 464, 465–66 (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (“It proves incontestably that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three 
departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible 
care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.”); see, e.g., Tony Badger, Brown and 
Backlash, in MASSIVE RESISTANCE: SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 39 
(Clive Webb ed., 2005) (describing the southern backlash to Brown and its origins in conservative 
resistance to racial change).   
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things.72  First, the Court would have to identify the harm from mal-
apportioned districts and a rule to remedy the harm that can be directly 
derived from the Constitution.  It was critical that the harm identified and 
the rule developed also appeal to the democratic intuitions of the People, 
since their support was necessary to defend courts from attack by the 
political institutions responsible for drawing the mal-apportioned districts 
and the representatives that benefited from the districting practice.  
Second, the rule developed would have to be one that states could easily 
follow and courts could easily apply.  An objective and easily applicable 
test was necessary for courts to avoid discretionary judgments that could 
deepen judicial entanglement in the political partisanship surrounding 
districting and make the Court vulnerable to accusations of political bias. 
Two years after Baker v. Carr, the Court embarked on the task of 
developing a constitutional rule applicable to mal-apportioned districts.  In 
Wesberry, the Court addressed a challenge to Georgia’s mal-apportioned 
congressional districts.73  The Court found that as a result of mal-
apportionment, “[a] single Congressman [from the urban district including 
Atlanta] represents from two to three times as many . . . voters as are 
represented by each of the Congressmen from the other Georgia 
congressional districts.”74  That disparity, the Court held, ran afoul of “the 
command of Article I, § 2 [of the Constitution], that Representatives be 
chosen ‘by the People of the several States.’”75  This constitutional 
command, the Court explained, meant that “as nearly as is practicable one 
man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as 
another’s.”76 
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provided an odd legal basis for 
the Court to strike down mal-apportioned districts.  This provision arose 
                                                          
 72.  In Colegrove v. Green, a plurality of the Court in an opinion written by Justice Felix 
Frankfurter asserted that constitutional claims against mal-apportioned districts were “of a peculiarly 
political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination.”  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 
552 (1946).  Given the close proximity of the decision to the Lochner era of aggressive judicial 
intervention into the democratic process and the political backlash that such intervention produced, it 
seems clear that the plurality was motivated by the desire to preserve the Court’s integrity and 
legitimacy.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (“The 
received wisdom is that Lochner was wrong because it involved ‘judicial activism’: an illegitimate 
intrusion by the courts into a realm properly reserved to the political branches of government.”); See 
also Guy Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the 
Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1103, 1109 (2002) (“Justice Frankfurter’s 
apologia in Colegrove . . . is fundamentally an argument about the proper role of the judiciary in the 
political process.”).   
 73.   Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1964).   
 74.   Id. at 7. 
 75.   Id. at 7–8.  
 76.   Id.   
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from the famous Connecticut Compromise (also known as the “Great 
Compromise”) between the representational demands of large and small 
population states during the Constitutional Convention.77  The 
compromise produced a bicameral legislature in which representation in 
the House of Representatives was by population and representation in the 
Senate was divided equally among the states.78 
For the House of Representatives, Article I, Section 2 requires that 
every state have the same number of seats in proportion to its population 
as every other state.79  But Article I, Section 2 says nothing about how the 
states must apportion representation within their states.  Nonetheless, from 
the constitutional text and debates during the Constitutional Convention, 
the Court in Wesberry derived a constitutional principle that supported 
extending Article I, Section 2’s reach to controversies about the 
apportionment of representation within the states.80  In identifying the 
constitutional wrong from mal-apportioned districts, the Court focused on 
the harmful effect on the individual’s vote and the relationship between 
this harm, democratic government, and our constitutional commitments.81  
“To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not 
only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government,” the 
Court explained, “it would cast aside the principle of a House of 
Representatives elected ‘by the People,’ a principle tenaciously fought for 
and established at the Constitutional Convention.”82 
Relying on quotes from prominent constitutional convention 
participants such as George Mason, James Madison, and James Wilson, 
the Court in Wesberry found, “[o]ne principle was uppermost in the minds 
of many delegates: that, no matter where he lived, each voter should have 
a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of Congress.”83  
According to the Court, the Framers secured this principle of “fair 
                                                          
 77.   See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 200–25 (1st ed. 2009) (providing an account of the Connecticut Compromise).   
 78.   Id.   
 79.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . . .”).   
 80.  Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 9-17.   
 81.  Id. at 8.   
 82.   Id. 
 83.   Id. at 10–11.  In Wesberry, the Court provided the following quotes of the Convention 
delegates: (1) James Madison: “If the power is not immediately derived from the people, in proportion 
to their numbers, we may make a paper confederacy, but that will be all.”  Id. at 10; (2) George Mason: 
“[The House of Representatives] was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the 
[Government].”  Id.; (3) James Wilson: “‘[E]qual numbers of people ought to have an equal [number] 
of representatives . . .’ and representatives ‘of different districts ought clearly to hold the same 
proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to each other.’”  Id. at 10–11. 
 
2018 A CONSTITUTIONAL PATH 937 
representation of the people” through a periodic census that assured “that 
‘number of inhabitants’ should always be the measure of representation in 
the House of Representatives.”84  From this evidence of the Framers’ 
intent, the Court set forth a constitutional rule to be applied to districting.  
The Court described the “Constitution’s plain objective” as “making equal 
representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the 
House of Representatives.”85 
The Court in Wesberry thus appeared to recognize both participatory 
and representation harms from mal-apportioned districts.  But while there 
is some ambiguity, the reasoning in the case suggests that the Court 
adopted a particular view about the relationship between the two harms 
arising from malapportionment that informed its constitutional 
enforcement role.  For the Court, the primary target appeared to be the 
participatory harm produced by malapportioned districts arising from the 
unequal weighting of individuals’ votes.  The remedy of equally 
apportioned districts most directly redressed the participatory harm by 
ensuring that everyone’s vote counted the same.  This remedy would also 
lead to more fairness in representation, defined as equal representation for 
individuals in the political process.  Such equal representation ultimately 
translates into a system in which a majority of individuals are able to elect 
a majority of representatives. 
In Wesberry, the Court did not seem concerned by the harm particular 
groups might suffer if not represented.  Malapportioned districts did dilute 
the representation of urban interests in state legislatures and Congress.86  
But the Court never said anything about this effect of malapportionment 
on the representation of groups or how equally apportioned districts 
remedied the under-representation of particular groups.  For the Court to 
redress group-based representation harms, it would have had to construct 
a baseline measure of fair representation for groups.87  Further, given that 
it is unlikely that equally apportioned districts alone would guarantee fair 
representation for all groups in the political process, the Court would also 
need to impose additional constraints on the operation of democratic 
politics or explain why some unfairly represented groups were not entitled 
                                                          
 84.   Id. at 13–14.   
 85.   Id. at 18.   
 86.  ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER JR., supra note 69, at 68 (describing urban interests as losers 
from malapportionment). 
 87.   See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation 
and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1380 (1997) (describing the difficulty of identifying 
a baseline of fairness for groups in a districting map).   
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to constitutional protection.88  The Court in Wesberry did neither.  The 
absence of judicial reasoning focused on group-based representation 
harms and the lack of a remedy responsive to such harms therefore 
suggests the Court’s exclusive focus was on individual participatory harms 
arising from malapportioned districts. 
The reasoning in the case of Reynolds v. Sims further supports the 
argument that the Court’s primary constitutional target was the harms 
individuals experienced from unequal participation.89  In Reynolds, the 
Court addressed the constitutionality of malapportioned state legislative 
districts in Alabama.90  Since Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution 
only applied to congressional apportionment, the Court had to look 
elsewhere for a constitutional textual basis to review state malapportioned 
districts.91  Two years earlier in Baker v. Carr, the Court hinted at the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and its “well developed 
and familiar” judicial standards as the constitutional basis for adjudicating 
challenges to malapportioned state legislative districts.92  In Reynolds, the 
Court took the next step of identifying the harms from malapportioned 
districts and the constitutional standard applicable to such districts. 
The Court in Reynolds advanced an elaborate description of the 
participatory rights implicated by malapportionment and the relationship 
between participatory rights and democratic government.93  The Court 
explained, “[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of 
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike 
at the heart of representative government.”94  This right to vote, the Court 
continued, “can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a 
citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise 
of the franchise.”95  The Court acknowledged that a state, in responding to 
the decision, might “require the restructuring of the geographical 
distribution of seats in a state legislature.”96  But the Court made clear that 
the target for judicial evaluation should not be the structure of 
                                                          
 88.   The Court’s decision in Fortson was a recognition that equally apportioned districts would 
not lead to the fair representation in the political process of members of all groups.  See infra Part II.B.  
 89.   Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 90.   Id. at 537.  
 91.   Article I, Section 2 established a constitutional rule for the apportionment of the House of 
Representatives.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among 
the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers.”).   
 92.   Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).   
 93.   Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554–55.   
 94.   Id. at 555.   
 95.   Id.   
 96.   Id. at 561.   
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representation.  Rather, the “judicial focus must be concentrated upon 
ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination against certain of 
the State’s citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of their 
constitutionally protected right to vote.”97  The judicially enforceable 
constitutional mandate, the Court announced, is “full and effective 
participation” for all citizens in the democratic process, meaning that 
“each citizen ha[s] an equally effective voice in the election of 
[legislators].”98 
The Court acknowledged the effect on representative government of 
state compliance with the constitutional requirement of full and effective 
participation.  As in Wesberry, the logical consequence from granting all 
citizens an equally effective voice in electing representatives is majority 
rule.  In Reynolds, the Court explained, a system in which “a majority of 
the people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s legislators” is 
something that legislative apportionment with its aim of “achieving . . . 
fair and effective representation for all citizens” should strive for.99  The 
alternative of malapportioned districts that “sanction minority control of 
state legislative bodies,” the Court surmised, “would appear to deny 
majority rights in a way that far surpasses any possible denial of minority 
rights that might otherwise be thought to result.”100 
The Reynolds majority’s discussion of the consequence of 
malapportionment for representative government exposed it to the critique 
that the Court was imposing a particular political philosophy on its 
citizens.  Dissenting in a parallel case, Justice Potter Stewart keyed in on 
the Court’s assertion about representative government.  Justice Stewart 
criticized the majority for “convert[ing] a particular political philosophy 
into a constitutional rule, binding upon each of the [fifty] States . . . .”101  
Since “no one theory has ever commanded unanimous assent among 
political scientists, historians, or others,” Justice Stewart argued, the states 
should have leeway in deciding on the appropriate form of representative 
government consistent with their “distinct history, distinct geography, 
distinct distribution of population, and distinct political heritage.”102  One 
such alternative theory that Justice Stewart identified views 
“[r]epresentative government [as] a process of accommodating group 
                                                          
 97.   Id.   
 98.   Id. at 565.   
 99.   Id. at 565–66.  
 100.   Id. at 565.  
 101.   Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 748 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting).   
 102.   Id. at 748–49. 
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interests through democratic institutional arrangements.”103  In this 
representative system, the goal is “to channel the numerous opinions, 
interests, and abilities of the people of a State into the making of the State’s 
public policy.”104  This representative process can be advanced through 
malapportioned districts that deny majority rule because such districts 
might provide opportunities for “fair, effective, and balanced 
representation of the regional, social, and economic interests within a 
State.”105 
Justice Stewart’s critique of the Reynolds majority was powerful, but 
it ultimately misunderstood the basis for the decision.  The Reynolds 
majority did not invalidate malapportioned districts because they failed to 
provide fair and effective representation in the form of majority rule, a 
democratic principle nowhere explicitly contained in the Constitution.  
Rather, the Court struck down malapportioned districts because they 
imposed unconstitutional participatory harms on individuals by diluting 
their vote. 
As a reluctant intervener into districting controversies, the Court 
sought to confine its interference into democratic politics to protecting the 
rights of individuals.  As the Court explained in Reynolds, “[a] 
predominant consideration in determining whether a State’s legislative 
apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative of 
rights asserted under the Equal Protection Clause is that the rights 
allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature.”106  The Court’s 
review of apportionment schemes therefore had to be “concentrated upon 
ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination against certain of 
the State’s citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of their 
constitutionally protected right to vote.”107  The Court did recognize that 
remedying individual rights through a constitutional mandate of equally 
apportioned districts would advance a representative government principle 
of majority rule.108  But for the Court, majority rule was simply a 
consequence of constitutional protection for individual voting rights, not 
the goal.  The Court sought to avoid, as much as it could, imposing any 
particular political philosophy on its citizens. 
                                                          
 103.   Id. at 749.  
 104.   Id.  
 105.   Id. at 751.  
 106.   Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).   
 107.   Id.   
 108.   The Court in Reynolds was clear in descirbing the achievement of “fair and effective 
representation” as “the basic aim of legislative apportionment.”  Id. at 565–56.  The Court never 
declared “fair and effective representation” to be a judicially enforceable constituitonal mandate.   
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B. The Curious Case of Fortson v. Dorsey 
A year after deciding Reynolds, the Court addressed the challenge to 
multi-member districts in Fortson v. Dorsey.109  In Fortson, the Court 
determined that multi-member districts that maintained the same 
population to representative ratio as single-member districts were 
presumptively constitutional.110  But the Court opened the door to judicial 
recognition of a constitutional claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause, even when districts are properly apportioned.  As 
already quoted, the Court explained, “[i]t might well be that, designedly 
or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under 
the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel 
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting 
population.”111  In Whitcomb, the poor African Americans of Marion 
County, Indiana relied on this dictum to claim that multi-member districts 
denying them the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice violated 
the Equal Protection Clause.112 
Did the Court in Fortson expand its recognition of the constitutional 
harms from districting practices to encompass group-based representation 
harms?  Some support for this idea can be found in Justice Stewart’s 
decision to join the opinion.  As indicated in his dissent to the one-person, 
one-vote cases, Justice Stewart did not support the one-person, one-vote 
rule.  He was instead a proponent for recognizing a philosophy of 
democratic politics centered on the accommodation of group interests.113  
But if the Court in Fortson recognized as a constitutional harm the denial 
to groups of their representational rights, it would have stunningly 
reversed itself one year after narrowly construing the constitutional harm 
in individual participatory terms in Reynolds v. Sims.  Further, interpreting 
Fortson as establishing a constitutional rule under the Equal Protection 
Clause protecting groups from discrimination would have represented a 
striking departure from the Court’s past constitutional jurisprudence.  Up 
until Fortson, the Court had consistently protected individuals from 
discrimination because of their membership in a group, but it had never 
explicitly protected groups from discrimination.114 
                                                          
 109.   Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).   
 110.   Id. at 435–36. 
 111.   Id. at 439.   
 112.   See supra Part I.   
 113.   See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text. 
 114.   For an account of the competing individual-based and group-based conceptions of the Equal 
Protection Clause, see generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
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While on its face it might seem to be a strange place to look, a famous 
Sherlock Holmes short story can perhaps provide a clue as to whether the 
Court intended to recognize group-based representation harms from 
districting practices.  In the short story “Silver Blaze,” Holmes sets about 
solving the mystery of the disappearance of a famous prize-winning 
racehorse and the apparent murder of its trainer the night before an 
important race.115  One piece of evidence that helps Holmes, and his 
omnipresent assistant, Dr. Watson, solve the case is the “curious incident 
of the dog in the night-time.”116  The details of the curious incident unfold 
in a conversation between a Scotland Yard detective, Gregory, and 
Holmes: 
Gregory: Is there any other point to which you wish to draw my 
attention? 
Holmes: To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time. 
Gregory: The dog did nothing in the night-time. 
Holmes: That was the curious incident.117 
The dog, doing nothing, indicated that a person familiar to the dog 
must have been involved in the crime.  Otherwise, the dog would have 
barked.  Courts have relied on the “Silver Blaze” story to develop a canon 
of statutory interpretation known as the “dog that did not bark.”118  As 
applied in the statutory interpretation context, the failure of the legislature 
to comment upon or debate a change to a major policy ostensibly produced 
by a statute indicates that the statute did not change the major policy.119  
Courts treat the lack of legislative comment and debate on an important 
policy issue as the equivalent of the dog not barking in “Silver Blaze” and 
an indicator of the legislature’s intent that the status quo on the issue 
remains undisturbed.120 
The “dog that did not bark” canon can also be persuasively applied to 
the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.  Reasoned analysis is central to 
                                                          
PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).   
 115.   ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 335–50 
(Doubleday & Co. 1930).   
 116.   Id. at 347.   
 117.   Id.   
 118.   See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Sherlock Holmes Canon, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1 (2016) (providing a detailed account of the “dog that did not bark” canon).  
 119.   Id. at 2–3.   
 120.   Id. at 3.   
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judicial decision-making and it preserves judicial legitimacy and standing 
in a democracy as a branch of government comprised of unaccountable, 
unelected, life tenured judges.121  Failure to reason through major 
jurisprudential change that results in the adjustment of old, or the adoption 
of new, constitutional rules or standards will subject courts to accusations 
of arbitrariness.122  It therefore should be presumed that reasoned analysis 
will accompany any major changes in doctrine, particularly the 
constitutional doctrine for which the Court has asserted supremacy in the 
form of the final say about what the Constitution means.123  The Court in 
Wesberry and Reynolds reasoned through and justified its intervention into 
districting controversies by providing a textual, historical, and doctrinal 
basis for the individual participatory harms it recognized in those cases.124  
The Court provided no such reasoning or justification for the recognition 
of a new constitutional group-based representational harm in Fortson or 
in any other case that followed.  In other words, the dog did not bark, which 
strongly suggests the Court did not intend in Fortson to recognize a group-
based representational harm. 
A theory of the harm underlying Fortson should therefore be 
understood in terms consistent with Wesberry and Reynolds.  In the next 
Part, I argue that like the one-person, one-vote standard in Wesberry and 
Reynolds, Fortson’s constitutional standard also targets an individual 
participatory harm.  Whereas the Court in Wesberry and Reynolds adopted 
a constitutional rule that protects the individual right to full participation 
in the political process, the Court in Fortson established a constitutional 
standard designed to protect the right to effective participation in the 
political process.  After identifying the right to effective participation, I 
then examine the meaning of this right and how judicial protection of poor 
individuals’ right to effective participation can lead to greater fairness of 
representation of the group in the political process. 
                                                          
 121.   See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1005–08 (2008) 
(explaining the value of public justification through judicial reasoned analysis).   
 122.   See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers Lie, 
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1109 (2010) (“[I]n most democratic legal systems, the requirement to give 
reasons has been constructed on the principle that public institutions should not enjoy arbitrary 
power.”).   
 123.   See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (interpreting Marbury v. Madison as 
“declar[ing] the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution”).   
 124.   See supra notes 68–101 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION 
In the years immediately following the ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1870, Congress passed a series of acts to enforce the 
amendment.125  Revised versions of two of these acts would later provide 
the basis for judicial protections of the right to vote under the Constitution.  
Section 19 of the Criminal Code criminalized any conspiracy between two 
or more persons “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in 
the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States.”126  Section 20 of the 
Criminal Code made it a crime for anyone who, acting “under color of any 
law . . . willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any 
State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”127 
In two cases in the 1940s, the Court constructed a constitutional right 
to vote as part of its interpretation of the two statutes.  In the first case, 
United States v. Classic, the United States brought an indictment against 
the Louisiana state commissioner of elections under Sections 19 and 20 of 
the Criminal Code alleging that he had “willfully altered and falsely 
counted and certified the ballots of voters cast in [a] primary election.”128  
The Court, relying on Article I, Section 2’s mandate that congresspersons 
be chosen by the people of the several states, defined the constitutional 
right protected under the Criminal Acts to broadly include “the right of 
qualified voters. . . to cast their ballots and have them counted . . . .”129 
In the second case, United States v. Saylor, the United States brought 
an indictment under Section 19 of the Criminal Code against conspirators 
for allegedly depriving individuals of “their right to have their expressions 
of choice given full value and effect by not having their votes impaired, 
lessened, diminished, diluted and destroyed by fictitious ballots 
fraudulently cast and counted, recorded, returned, and certified.”130  The 
Court determined that the constitutional rights protected under the 
Criminal Acts also included the right to vote undiluted by fraudulent 
practices.131 
                                                          
 125.   For a historical account of statutes enforcing the Reconstruction-era amendments, see ERIC 
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 454–59 (Henry Steel 
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988).   
 126.   Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321 ch. 3 § 19, 35 Stat. 1092 (1909).   
 127.   Id. 
 128.   United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 307 (1941).  
 129.   Id. at 315.   
 130.   United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 386 (1944). 
 131.   Id. at 389 (“For election officers knowingly to prepare false ballots, place them in the box, 
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In Wesberry and Reynolds, the Court relied on these cases in its 
articulation of the participatory harm from malapportioned districts.  
According to the Court, the constitutional problem with malapportioned 
districts was their effect in lessening, diminishing, or diluting the value of 
individuals’ votes.132  But the Court in Classic and Saylor was not only 
concerned that fraudulent ballot practices would deny an individual the 
full value of her vote by lessening, diminishing, or diluting its value.  The 
Court was also concerned that fraudulent ballot practices might impair or 
destroy an individual’s vote.  We can understand how fraudulent ballot 
practices might impair or destroy an individual’s vote by considering the 
potential implications of the practice on the influence of an individual’s 
vote.   
To take an extreme example, if a representative knows that she can 
secure election through ballot stuffing practice that guarantees to her a 
majority of the vote irrespective of turnout, then she has no incentives to 
respond to, account for, or consider the interests or needs of actual voters.  
While this example might seem fantastical in the context of the United 
States, we do see practices that come close to this extreme in other less-
developed democracies.133 
We, however, do not need to go to this extreme to see how an 
individual’s vote might be destroyed or impaired in the context of 
fraudulent ballot practices.  It could be that the fraudulent practice 
combined with turnout from supporters provides the election guarantee.  
In this hypothetical context, the representative retains the electoral 
incentives to be responsive and accountable to supporters and the vote of 
individual supporters continues to be meaningful in securing influence 
over their representative.  But the representative has no incentive to be 
responsive, accountable, or considerate to the interests of opponents.  
Since the representative will never need individual opponents’ votes 
because opponents cannot change election outcomes, the votes of these 
                                                          
and return them, is certainly to prevent an honest count by the return board of the votes lawfully cast.”).   
 132.   See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (citing to Classic and Saylor and holding, 
“not only can th[e] right to vote not be denied outright, it cannot, consistently with Article I, be 
destroyed by alteration of ballots or diluted by stuffing of the ballot box.  No right is more precious in 
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citizens, we must live.”) (citations omitted); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (citing to 
Classic and Saylor and holding that “[t]he right to vote can neither be denied outright, nor destroyed 
by alteration of ballots, nor diluted by ballot-box stuffing”) (citations omitted).   
 133.   See e.g., MISHA MYAGKOV & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, RUSSIAN ELECTIONS: AN OXYMORON 
OF DEMOCRACY (2008), https://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2008_822-11_Ordeshook.pdf (discussing 
the prevalence of fraud in Russian elections).  
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individual members of the opposition have been destroyed or impaired by 
being rendered meaningless. 
While the focus in Classic and Saylor was on fraud, such fraud is not 
a necessary condition for rendering an individual’s vote meaningless.  
Focusing on districts, a state legislature or redistricting commission could 
construct districts in a way that renders the votes of individuals 
meaningless.  In the United States, political parties and the candidates that 
affiliate with them are the primary vehicles for representation.134  The level 
of individual or group affiliation with one of the two dominant parties 
varies from strong supporters like evangelical Christians for Republicans 
and African Americans for Democrats, to weak supporters whose 
affiliations have historically shifted or been divided, such as working class 
whites.135  If the state legislature draws districts to include, for example, a 
sufficient base of strong supporters guaranteeing a party representative re-
election, the votes of non-supporters in the district can be rendered 
meaningless.136  Since the representative knows she can win without the 
votes of non-supporters, she has no incentive to be responsive, 
accountable, or even considerate of the needs and interests of non-
supporters.  As a result, non-supporters are denied their opportunity to 
influence elections and even the minimal form of representation in the 
form of the representative’s consideration of their needs and interests in 
her policy decisions.  In the language of Fortson, the state has drawn the 
district in a way that “minimize[s] or cancel[s] out” the vote of particular 
elements (individuals) in the district.137  The right to effective participation 
should thus be understood as the right of individuals to exercise through 
their vote enough influence over the representative to ensure that they 
cannot be entirely ignored without electoral consequences for the 
representative. 
A state’s infringement on the right to effective participation cannot be 
as easily ascertained as a state’s infringement on the right to full 
participation.  But there are two important indicators of when an 
individual’s right to effective participation might have been infringed.  
First, consistently low turnout of members of certain groups relative to the 
                                                          
 134.   See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? A SECOND LOOK 3 (2011) (“The political party 
as a collective enterprise, organizing competition for the full range of offices, provides the only means 
for holding elected officials responsible for what they do collectively.”). 
 135.   Id. at 9–10 (describing the evolving coalitions associated with the two parties in the United 
States).   
 136.   See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
644–45 (2002) (criticizing legislators’ self-interested drawing of safe districts). 
 137.   Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). 
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overall turnout level in the district is an indicator that members of the 
groups have been marginalized to the extent that they do not deem it 
worthwhile to vote.138  This very low turnout for members of a group 
suggests that the group is caught in the vicious cycle of 
underrepresentation in which lack of legislative responsiveness has 
contributed to low turnout.139  Second, consistently high margins of victory 
for representatives in the district might be an indicator that the lack of 
district competitiveness is a contributing factor to the representative’s non-
responsiveness to members of the marginalized group, which then leads 
marginalized group members to abstain from voting.140  The appropriate 
triggers for constitutional review in terms of level of turnout and margins 
of electoral victory should be decided after rigorous judicial engagement 
with facts on the ground.  But once determined, courts should consistently 
apply the trigger in future cases.141 
When a state through its districting practices denies members of a 
group the right to effective participation, a different remedy from the one 
the poor African Americans proposed in Whitcomb should follow.  The 
poor African Americans in Marion County, Indiana claimed a group 
entitlement to more proportionate representation in the state legislature 
through single-member districts that they could electorally control.142  This 
remedy depends on judicial recognition of a constitutional right that is 
distinct from the right to effective participation advanced in Classic and 
Saylor and ultimately embraced in Wesberry and Reynolds.143  The right 
of individuals to effectively participate does not translate into a guarantee 
of electoral control for groups over a proportional number of districts.  
                                                          
 138.   See supra note 25 (identifying as a source of non-voting, a perception by individuals that 
there are no benefits to be derived from voting because of the non-responsiveness of legislators to their 
interests and needs).   
 139.   See supra note 26–27 (describing the vicious cycle of underrepresentation).   
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Edward G. Carmines, The Enduring Effects of Competitive Elections, 24 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION 
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 142.   See supra note 59. 
 143.   See supra Part II.A. 
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Instead, it should translate into an opportunity to be heard through the 
construction of districts in which candidates are forced to compete for 
everyone’s votes. 
A further complication with the challenger’s proposed remedy in 
Whitcomb is that our constitutional system is not designed to secure 
proportional representation for groups in the political process.144  
Imposition of proportional representation would require the Court to adopt 
a particular political philosophy nowhere grounded in the Constitution that 
would potentially have even greater consequences for our electoral system 
than the requirement of one-person, one-vote. 
Finally, it is not clear that the remedy of providing groups an 
opportunity to control districts would be the most effective means for 
securing representation for all groups.  Congress established a statutory 
right to group-based representation for racial minority groups in the 
Voting Rights Act that proved successful at increasing both the descriptive 
and substantive representation of African Americans in the political 
process.145  But African Americans are distinct from the poor in an 
important respect.  Prior to Congress’s establishment of a group 
representation guarantee in the VRA, civil rights groups mobilized African 
Americans to vote and to vote cohesively against elected leaders that 
ignored and neglected the group’s interests and needs.146  Thus, when the 
time came, African Americans were able to take advantage of the statutory 
remedy of opportunity-to-control districts and elect candidates of their 
choice.147 
Unlike African Americans, the poor are not the beneficiaries of a 
social movement mobilizing them to vote.  Forcing states to draw districts 
that the poor should be able to control on the basis of their numbers is 
therefore much less likely to secure representation for the poor than it did 
for African Americans.  Evidence supporting that prediction can be found 
                                                          
 144.   See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75–76 (1980) (“The Equal Protection Clause of 
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in a study finding that representatives of districts with more poor 
individuals are less likely to support legislation favorable to the poor than 
representatives of districts with fewer poor people.148  This suggests that 
representatives feel they can safely ignore poor voters without electoral 
consequences even when the poor comprise a relatively high proportion of 
individuals in the district. 
Before a VRA-like remedy of opportunity-to-control districts can be 
effective in securing representation for the poor, what is needed is a 
constitutional remedy that can incentivize parties, candidates, and interest 
groups to mobilize the poor.  Forcing states to make districts more 
competitive is one such remedy that might produce the necessary 
incentives for candidates to mobilize and for elected officials to ultimately 
represent the poor.149  Greater competitiveness will increase the intensity 
and expansiveness of candidate mobilization efforts and raise the costs to 
candidates of ignoring voters or potential voters.150  When governing, 
electoral risk aversion should lead representatives to consider and 
incorporate the needs and interests of as many constituents as possible.  
This does not mean that representatives will make policy decisions 
advancing the needs and interests of all of their constituents; the needs and 
interests of constituents will, at times, necessarily conflict making it 
impossible to do so.  But what it might mean is that representatives will 
have electoral incentives to consider the degree and intensity of needs and 
interests of a broader constituency when making policy decisions.  This 
could lead to changes in representatives’ roll call votes, decisions on what 
legislation to advance and consider, and determinations about the nature 
and form of their policy platforms, among other more broadly responsive 
activities. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The time for judicial enforcement of the right to effective participation 
is now.  Over the past sixty years, there has been a significant decline in 
the competitiveness of legislative races.151  According to one important 
barometer of competitiveness, incumbent re-election rates, 
competitiveness in U.S. House of Representative elections has been 
abysmally low since the mid-1970s.  In only two elections since 1974 has 
the re-election rate for members of the House dipped below 90 percent.152  
In over half of the elections during this period (11 out of 21), the re-
election rate in the House stood at 95 percent or higher.153  This lack of 
competitiveness has coincided with relatively low turnout among 
politically marginalized and alienated poor individuals.154  From this 
confluence of low competitiveness and turnout among the poor, legislation 
like the Tax Cut and Jobs Act is passed that burdens the poor without any 
elected officials speaking for the poor.  It is impossible to say what type 
of tax law Congress would have passed if more of its members had been 
subject to competitive elections, but it is extremely unlikely that both 
political parties would have entirely ignored the negative effect of the law 
on the poor. 
As was the case when the Court decided to enter the political thicket 
of districting in the 1960s, courts are needed to remedy political process 
dysfunction because the People’s representatives have no incentives to do 
so.  The construction of competitive districts is antithetical to the interests 
of representatives who prefer safe electoral districts that can guarantee 
them re-election.  Therefore, to solve the democratic dilemma of political 
marginalization, courts need to step in and enforce the overlooked 
constitutional right of individuals to effectively participate in the political 
process. 
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